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HUMAN RIGHTS DUTIES TOWARDS FUTURE GENERATIONS AND 
THE POTENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING CLIMATE JUSTICE 
 
BRIDGET LEWIS
*
 
 
Abstract 
 
Human rights-based approaches to climate change promise to address the intergenerational 
injustices of climate change by incorporating an enhanced consideration of the needs of 
future generations. Yet, a number of questions arise when one contemplates how 
international human rights law might accommodate the rights of persons as yet unborn.  
Among them are the theoretical questions of whether it is possible for future generations to 
possess human rights and for present generations to owe them corresponding duties. 
Assuming that such a theoretical conceptualisation is possible, a number of legal issues are 
present in attempting to protect the rights of future generations within current international 
human rights law, including the question of how the rights of future generations can be 
balanced against those of current generations. The paper will examine a number of domestic 
measures designed to protect the rights of future generations and consider how such 
mechanisms might contribute to a rights-based approach to resolving intergenerational 
climate injustice.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now well accepted that climate change will impact on the ability of individuals and 
communities to enjoy their human rights, as well as on the capacity of governments to protect 
and promote those rights. Not only will the environmental consequences of climate change 
impact on human rights which are guaranteed under law, but the steps taken to mitigate and 
adapt to those consequences also have the potential to interfere with the enjoyment of rights, 
now and into the future. Given these impacts, the role of human rights law in combatting 
climate change and the possibilities for human rights-based approaches to climate change 
have been explored from various perspectives.
1
 One of the suggested benefits of a human 
rights-based approach to climate change is that it could help to address climate injustice. 
Such injustice is inherent in the fact that the worst effects of climate change will be felt by 
those who have contributed least to the problem, and it represents one of the key challenges 
in locating responses to climate change which are effective, equitable and politically 
acceptable.  
Climate injustice has both intra- and intergenerational dimensions, and is complicated 
by the extra-territorial and cumulative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, presenting 
significant questions in relation to how to distribute responsibility for past emissions, 
transboundary impacts and future effects. The intragenerational injustices of climate change 
are intended to be addressed within the climate change regime through principles such as 
                                                 
1 See Meinhard Doelle, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: The Role of International Human Rights in 
Motivating States to Take Climate Change Seriously’ (2004) 1 Macquarie Journal of International and 
Comparative Environmental Law 179; Sara C Aminzadeh, 'A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights 
Implications of Climate Change' (2006-2007) 30 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 231; 
Derek Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights’ (2011) 14 Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 99; Derek Bell, ‘Climate change and Human Rights’ (2013) 4 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 159; Michael Depledge and Cinnamon Carlane, ‘Sick of the 
Weather: Climate Change, Human Health and International Law’ (2007) 9 Environmental Law Review 23; 
Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (CUP, 2010);  John Knox, ‘Climate Change and 
Human Rights Law’ (2009-2010) 50 Virginia Journal of International Law 163; John Knox, ‘Linking Human 
Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 477; Marc 
Limon, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action’ (2009) 33 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 439; Ole W Pedersen, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: Amicable or Arrested 
Development?’ (2010) 1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 236; Daud Hassan and Awal Khan, 
‘Climate-change-related Human Rights Violations’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law and Policy 80; Pamela 
Stephens, ‘Applying Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: The Elusive Remedy’ (2010) 21 Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 49. 
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‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and the ‘polluter pays’ principle.2 The 
intergenerational injustice of climate change lies in the fact that future generations will suffer 
the effects of past and current emissions, even if they contribute relatively little or even no 
emissions themselves. In order to contribute meaningfully to combatting the full impact of 
climate change, a human rights-based approach must therefore acknowledge not only 
intragenerational but also intergenerational injustices, and must consider the needs of both 
present and future generations. To date, comparatively less attention has been paid to the 
rights of future generations, notwithstanding the significant impacts they are likely to 
confront and their vulnerability to the actions taken by present generations.
3
 Further, while 
action to address climate change for current generations may also have positive benefits for 
future generations, their interests will not always coincide and independent consideration of 
the interests of future generations is warranted. 
However, while human rights law is experienced in dealing with the rights of existing 
individuals and communities, its application to future generations presents several issues.  
First, can future generations be said to possess human rights, such that present generations 
owe them corresponding obligations? Second, if such obligations exist, how should they be 
balanced against potentially competing duties already owed to present generations? Further, 
how well-equipped is human rights law to enforce obligations owed to persons not yet born, 
who are not able to bring claims for enforcement of their rights? This paper will endeavour to 
address these questions by considering a number of theoretical and practical dimensions.  
After first briefly outlining the injustice of climate change in terms of its human rights 
impact for future generations, the paper then considers various theoretical approaches to the 
question of whether future generations can possess human rights. The paper argues that it is 
possible to conceive of future generations possessing rights and of current generations owing 
obligations with respect to those rights. However, there are a number of structural and 
practical limitations to human rights-based approaches to climate change, which the paper 
                                                 
2 Kati Kulovesi and Maria Gutierrez, ‘Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and Prospects for a 
Copenhagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009’ (2009) 18 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 229, 236; Angela Williams, ‘Promoting Justice within the International Legal System – 
Prospects for Climate Refugees’ in Benjamin J Richardson and others (eds), Climate Law and Developing 
Countries: Legal and Policy Changes for the World Economy (Edward Elgar 2009) 84, 90; United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 
UNTS 107 art 3(1). 
3 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Tenth session,  ‘Report of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and 
Human Rights’ (15 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, [32] (2009 OHCHR Report). 
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will then describe, identifying how these issues affect the application of human rights law to 
future generations. In attempting to identify solutions to these challenges, the paper will 
outline a number of domestic measures currently used to protect the rights of future 
generations and examine how they could be used to address climate injustice at the 
international level.  
The paper concludes that, while it is theoretically possible to conceive of future 
generations possessing rights, there remain significant practical and legal barriers to a human 
rights-based approach to climate change which fully achieves justice for future generations. It 
argues that the introduction of a dedicated agency to advocate for future generations at the 
international level could be an effective way of ensuring that their rights are taken into 
consideration, thereby helping to ensure an equitable balance between the needs of present 
and future generations. 
 
2.  CLIMATE CHANGE INJUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE  
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects with confidence that 
climate change will cause a number of serious environmental impacts, including heatwaves 
and drought,
4
 storms and cyclones,
5
 heavy precipitation events,
6
 and longer monsoon 
seasons.
7
 The human consequences of these environmental changes will be seen in impacts to 
health, livelihoods, housing, and social and cultural practices. While a number of these 
impacts are already being observed, it is predicted that they will continue to worsen into the 
future. This section briefly describes some of the key issues of concern in order to indicate 
the breadth and variety of implications.  
It is predicted that climate change will increase the number of persons suffering from 
death, disease, and injury.
8
 Malnutrition and other illness are likely to have future impacts on 
child growth and development.
9
 Higher temperatures are predicted to lead to a higher 
                                                 
4 Lisa Alexander and others, 'Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis - Summary for Policy Makers’     
(contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fifth Assessment Report, 
23; Christopher B Field and others, ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ 
(contribution of Working Group II to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fifth Assessment Report, 
31 March 2013) Summary for Policymakers, 7, 15.  
5 Alexander and others (n 4) 23; Field and others (n 4) 12. 
6 Alexander and others (n 4) 23. 
7 ibid 16. 
8 Field and others (n 4) 12, 20.  
9 ibid; Josef Schmidhuber and Francesco N Tubiello, ‘Global Food Security under Climate Change’ (2007) 
104(50) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 19703, 19703-19704; Ingrid Ahlgren, Seiji Yamada 
and Allen Wong, ‘Rising Oceans, Climate Change, Food Aid and Human Rights in the Marshall Islands’ (2014) 
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incidence of food poisoning, while extreme rainfall events and floods are likely to cause an 
increased prevalence of water-borne diseases such as cholera.
10
 Overall, rates of diarrhoeal, 
cardiorespiratory and infectious diseases are likely to increase,
11
 and it is expected that global 
warming may also lead to a spread of malaria and other vector-borne diseases into new 
areas.
12
   
A significant issue of concern is the exacerbation of existing food insecurity. The 
biggest losses of cropland due to climate change are likely to be in Africa
13
 and the current 
disparities in crop production between developed and developing countries are estimated to 
increase.
14
 Overall, the World Food Programme has predicted that by 2050, the number of 
people at risk of hunger as a result of climate change is expected to increase by 10-20 per 
cent more than would be the case in a world free of climate change, and that the number of 
malnourished children is expected to increase by 24 million, which represents a 21 per cent 
increase on the number which would be affected without climate change.
15
   
It is also predicted that climate change will increase the problems associated with 
unsafe and inadequate housing. Some communities and countries, such as Arctic 
communities, Small Island States and low-lying mega-delta regions are already particularly at 
risk of flooding, rising sea levels and storm surges, and these impacts are predicted to become 
more severe in the future.
16
 Additional pressure is likely to be placed on housing when people 
are forced to move to urban areas as rural livelihoods become less reliable. Today, an 
estimated 1 billion people live in urban slums in unsafe areas, such as fragile hillsides or 
flood-prone river banks, where they are more vulnerable to climate impacts. It is predicted 
                                                                                                                                                        
16(1) Health and Human Rights 69; Martin Parry and others, Climate Change and Hunger: Responding to the 
Challenge (World Food Programme, 2009) 14, 58; Hassan and Khan (n 1) 83. 
10 Schmidhuber and Tubiello (n 9) 19705. 
11 Field and others (n 4) 12, 20; 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3) [32]. 
12 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3) [32]; Edward Cameron, 'Human Rights and Climate Change: Moving From an 
Intrinsic to an Instrumental Approach' (2010) 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 673, 
702. 
13 Schmidhuber and Tubiello (n 9) 19704; Field and others (n 4) 17-19; 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3) [26]. 
14 Parry and others (n 9) 67, 73; Field and others (n 4) 7, 12, 20; Cameron (n 12) 702-703. See also UNHCR, 
‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’ (10 January 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/5. 
15 Parry and others (n 9) 4. 
16 Field and others (n 4) 15; Raquel Rolnik, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, contribution to ‘Human 
Rights Council Panel Discussion on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights’ (15 June 
2009) [13]. 
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that many more people will be forced to move to urban slums or informal settlements as a 
result of climate change.
17
 
As can be seen, the future effects of climate change are predicted to have a 
disproportionately negative impact on people and communities who are already at risk. For 
example, impacts are predicted to be worst for indigenous peoples and communities in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, where they are likely to exacerbate existing 
vulnerabilities and reduce the capacity of individuals and groups to adapt to climate change.
18
 
This fact presents significant issues relating to intragenerational injustice, and demands that 
responses to climate change give due consideration to the vulnerabilities and capabilities of 
each affected community or State.   
However, the long-term nature of many of these effects also indicates significant 
challenges in relation to intergenerational injustice. Given the length of time during which 
carbon remains in the atmosphere, even if greenhouse gas emissions were to cease now, 
future generations would continue to experience the negative impacts of historical emissions 
for some time. The injustice of climate change as it affects future generations can be 
understood having regard to John Rawls’ theory of distributive justice. Rawls argued that 
justice flows from an equitable (but not necessary equal) sharing of burdens and benefits.
19
 
Drawing on his approach, the injustice of climate change can be seen in two separate, though 
related dimensions. The first is that future generations will endure the consequences of 
current and past greenhouse gas emissions for which they are not responsible. The second is 
that future generations will not enjoy the benefits which were generated by those greenhouse 
gas emissions, at least not directly.
20
 Thus, climate injustice is inherent in the discrepancy 
between historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and the future impacts of those 
emissions.
21
   
                                                 
17 Rolnik (n 16) [13]; UN Development Programme, ‘Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate 
Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World’ (2008) 9 (2008 Human Development Report); 2009 OHCHR 
Report (n 3) [37]; Field and others (n 4) 18. 
18 Rhys Jones and others, ‘Climate Change and the Right to Health for Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand’ (2014) 
16 Health and Human Rights 54; 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3) [32]; UN Development Programme, ‘Human 
Development Report 2013’ (2013) 10, 95.   
19 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) 303; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement (Harvard University Press 2001) 42; Frank Lovett, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice: A Reader’s Guides 
(Continuum 2011) 29. For expansion of Rawls’ theory to the international sphere, see Thomas Pogge, ‘World 
Poverty and Human Rights’ (2005) 19 Ethics and International Affairs 1. 
20 It is acknowledged that future generations do benefit from emissions, which create long-lasting improvements 
to quality of life, such as the benefits which current generations enjoy from past processes of industrialisation. 
Much of the greenhouse gases emitted today are for more short-term purposes, however. 
21 For a detailed explanation of the justice implications of climate change for future generations, see Peter 
Lawrence, Future Generations, Climate Change and International Law (Edward Elgar 2014). See also Henry 
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A number of intersecting and complex issues need to be considered in devising 
climate change responses which can be considered just.
22
 These include distributing 
responsibility for past emissions, allocating future rights to emit and sharing the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation, having regard to the benefits attained by early industrialised, high-
emitting States compared to late-developing, low emitting States, and their differing adaptive 
capacities.
23
 When looking at how to distribute the burdens of addressing climate change, 
including the necessary transition to alternative energy and a non-carbon economy, justice 
requires current generations to take steps now rather than leaving the problem for future 
generations.
24
   
 While it is clear that climate change represents potentially serious injustices for future 
generations, questions remain as to how that injustice ought to be addressed and corrected by 
present generations. Human rights law might provide one answer, as the impacts of climate 
change can be easily seen to represent an interference with human rights. These impacts have 
been described in detail by various scholars, non-government organizations and international 
organizations,
25
 so it is not necessary to provide a full account here. However, even a brief 
account is sufficient to reveal the breadth and diversity of impacts.    
 For future generations, the impacts of climate change described above can be 
understood in terms of both direct and indirect interference with human rights. Direct impacts 
include interference with enjoyment of rights such as the right to life,
26
 the right to health,
27
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Shue, ‘Changing images of climate change: human rights and future generations’ (2014) 5 Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment 50; Achala Chandani, ‘Distributive Justice and Sustainability as a Viable 
Foundation for the Future Climate Regime’ (2007) 2 Carbon Climate Law Review 152, 155; Albert Mumma 
and David Hodas, ‘Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human 
Development’ (2007) 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 619, 639; Klaus Bosselman and 
Benjamin J Richardson, Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms: Key challenges for environmental law 
and policy (Kluwer Law 2009) 9. 
22 Ruchi Anand, International Environmental Justice: A North-South Dimension (Ashgate 2004) 27. 
23 ibid 27; Williams (n 2) 90. 
24 Shue (n 21) 59-61. See also Lawrence (n 21) and Richard P Hiskes, The Human Right to a Green Future: 
Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
25 See, for example: Doelle (n 1); Humphreys (n 1); Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ (n 1); 
Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change’ (n 1); Pedersen ‘Climate Change and Human Rights’ (n 1); 
Laura Westra, ‘Climate Change and the Human Right to Water’ (2010) 1 Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 161; Cameron (n 12); Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, Mac Darrow and Lavanya Rajamani, 
‘Human Rights and Climate Change: A Review of the International Legal Dimensions’ (World Bank 2011); 
United Nations Human Rights Council Res 7/23 (28 March 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/Res/7/23; UNHRC Res 10/4 
(25 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/Res10/4; 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3). 
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 6; United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘CCPR General Comment No 
6: The Right to Life’ (30 April 1982) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. 
27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) art 12; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
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the right to an adequate standard of living (including rights to food, water and housing),
28
 and 
the right to self-determination.
29
   
 As well as the specific rights which are affected by the environmental consequences 
of climate change, the steps taken to address climate change may also have negative impacts 
on human rights. A full consideration of the impact of climate change on future generations 
must also take into account the effects of the various mitigation and adaptation measures 
which States might implement. For example, where reallocation of land uses is employed as a 
mitigation or adaptation strategy, it may result in restrictions on subsistence farming which 
can have serious consequences for the rights to food, health, and life. For indigenous peoples, 
interference with access and use of land can have very serious and potentially irreversible 
impacts on the right to maintain a spiritual connection with lands and to practice cultural 
traditions.
30
 
There may also be broader consequences for people beyond those directly affected. 
For example, where incentives or subsidies are put in place to encourage farmers to switch 
from food production to biofuel cultivation, this can have broader impacts on food security, 
particularly in developing countries.
31
 Mitigation measures which involve transferring to 
alternative sources of energy may impact the affordability of energy for both current and 
future generations, with potentially negative impacts on people’s ability to enjoy a range of 
human rights.    
As this discussion shows, the impacts of climate change on human rights are 
multifaceted and interrelated. There are potentially serious impacts for both current and 
future generations, stemming from climate change itself and from the steps taken to address 
it. Governments face significant challenges in determining the appropriate course of action 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (11 August 
2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (CESCR General Comment 14); 2009 OHCHR report (n 3). 
28 ICESCR art 11; United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 12: 
The Right to Adequate Food’ (12 May 1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (CESRC General Comment 12) [6]; 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 7: Forced evictions, 
and the right to adequate housing’ (20 May 1997) UN Doc E/1998/22 (‘CESCR General Comment 7’); United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 15: The Right to Water’ (20 
January 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11 (CESRC General Comment 15). 
29 ICCPR art 1; ICESCR art 1; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted 13 
September 2007, UNGA Res 61/295) (UNDRIP). 
30 Ole W Pedersen, ‘The Janus-Head of Human Rights and Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation’ (2011) 
80 Nordic Journal of International Law 403, 405; UNDRIP (n 28); Frances Seymour, Forests, Climate Change 
and Human Rights: Managing Risks and Tradeoffs (Center for International Forestry Research 2008) 12. 
31 2009 OHCHR Report (n 3) [65]-[67]; Bridget Lewis, ‘Balancing Human Rights in Climate Policies’ in 
Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud Boumghar (eds), Climate Change and Human Rights (Routledge 2015) 39, 40; 
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and Climate Change (Northwestern University 2009) 27. 
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and the complexity of these decisions should not be underestimated. For example, where 
governments are required to divert resources to implement greenhouse gas mitigation or 
adaptation strategies, other programs which address human rights needs may become 
underfunded. But, at the same time, delaying action on climate change in order to focus on 
more immediate needs may have more serious consequences in the future, with future 
generations facing reduced capacity to fulfil the same needs. 
Human rights law can therefore be applied to describe the future impacts of climate 
change. The question remains as to how that law might be used to provide justice to future 
generations. Is it correct to say that our current actions could be considered violations of the 
rights of generations not yet born? The following section will consider the theoretical aspects 
of this question, focussing on the issues of whether future generations can be considered to be 
the bearers of human rights and whether current generations can be held to owe them 
corresponding duties.  
 
3.  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS OF FUTURE 
GENERATIONS  
 
As the previous section has outlined, climate change threatens to affect the ability of future 
generations to enjoy their human rights. However, the question of what obligations are owed 
by current generations toward those living in the future requires some consideration. Some 
scholars have argued that human rights can only be said to inhere in actual persons, such that 
current generations cannot be said to owe duties to persons as yet unborn.
32
 Consequently, 
current generations are not obliged to take action now on the basis that it is required to 
protect the rights of persons who will live in the future.  
 However, there are persuasive arguments against this approach and it is contended that 
current generations can in fact be said to owe duties to future generations.
33
  Elliot has argued 
that, because human rights are based on human interests, if it is accepted that the actions of 
                                                 
32 Alex Gosseries, ‘On Future Generations’ Future Rights’ (2008) 16 Journal of Political Philosophy 446, 456; 
Ruth Macklin ‘Can future generations correctly be said to have rights?’ in Ernest Partridge (ed), Responsibilities 
to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics (Prometheus 1981) 151, 152. See also Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic 
Climate Change Violate Human Rights?’ (n 1) 105; Richard de George, ‘The environment, rights and future 
generations’ in Ernest Partridge (ed), Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics 
(Prometheus 1981) 157. 
33 See, for example, Joel Feinberg, ‘The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations’ in Ernest Partridge (ed), 
Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics (Prometheus 1981) 139; Ernest Partridge, ‘On the 
Rights of Future Generations’ in Donald Scherer (ed), Upstream/Downstream: Issues in environmental ethics 
(Temple University Press 1990) 40. 
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current generations can affect the interests of future persons then it must also be accepted that 
those actions can impact upon the enjoyment of their rights. From this, he concludes that 
current generations have an obligation to refrain from acting in a way which will adversely 
affect the interests of future generations, as doing so would violate their rights.
34
 The fact that 
future persons do not yet exist does not prevent recognition that as soon as they are born they 
will have human rights. Given the certainty that persons will exist in the future and that they 
will possess rights, current generations are under an obligation not to act in a way now which 
will undermine the enjoyment of those rights in the future.
35
 
 A key objection to this line of reasoning is the non-identity problem identified by 
Parfit.
36
 Simply put, this problem flows from a recognition that our actions today not only 
influence the lives of persons in the future but also determine which people will exist in the 
future. It is therefore not possible to say that current actions harm or benefit future people 
because, were those actions to change, those persons would never exist. Applied to climate 
change, the non-identity problem confounds the argument that greenhouse gas emissions 
must be addressed in order to prevent harm to future generations. 
 Yet, the fact that the identities of future persons are currently unknown and are subject 
to change does not alter the fact that current actions will determine the quality of life they 
enjoy. Further, the non-identity problem does not address the morally intuitive sense that 
there is something wrong with knowingly acting in a way which will result in a poorer quality 
of life for persons in the future.  
 Scholars such as Brown Weiss, Bell, Feinberg, Elliot and Caney have argued that what 
matters is the knowledge that future people will exist, and that it makes little difference that 
their identities are presently unknown.
37
 As Bell has stated, ‘the indeterminacy of the identity 
of future persons does not offer any grounds for denying that they will have human rights’.38   
                                                 
34 Robert Elliot, ‘The Rights of Future People’ (1989) 6 Journal of Applied Philosophy 159, 162; Bell, ‘Does 
Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights?’ (n 1) 105. 
35 Feinberg (n 33) 147; Partridge (n 33) 53; Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights?’ 
(n 1) 106. 
36 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Clarendon 1984) 351ff. 
37 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and 
Intergenerational Equity (Transnational 1989) 96; Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human 
Rights?’ (n 1); Feinberg (n33); Elliot (n 34); Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Rights and Global Climate 
Change’ (2006) 19 Canadian Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 255, 267. 
38 Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights?’ (n 1) 107. See also Feinberg (n 33) 148; 
Partridge (n 33) 56; Lukas Meyer, ‘Past and Future: The Case for a Threshold Notion of Harm’ in Lukas Meyer, 
Stanley Paulson and Thomas Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political 
Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press 2003) 143, 146. 
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 Adopting an interest-theory account of human rights, Feinberg has also argued the 
rights of future generations must be acknowledged because it is known that they will possess 
interests, and that it is not necessary to know their identities in order to hold that they possess 
rights: ‘[t]he identity of the owners of these interests is now necessarily obscure, but their 
interest-ownership is crystal clear, and that is all that is necessary to certify the coherence of 
present talk about their rights’.39   
 Following this reasoning, it can be concluded that current generations have duties to 
take action with respect to climate change in order to ensure that the human rights of future 
generations are not violated. However, while the theoretical proposition that human rights 
duties are owed now towards future persons can be accepted, a number of difficulties arise in 
considering how to translate this concept into legal terms. One obvious difficulty relates to 
the justiciability and enforcement of those duties. Human rights law, as it is currently 
formulated, does not provide a mechanism for a claim to be brought on behalf of a person 
who does not yet exist. Even if the claim could be brought on their behalf, there would be 
significant challenges to proving a violation of human rights based on future impacts of 
current acts or omissions, and numerous authors have argued that, while a rights-based 
approach to climate change should address future generations, the current legal framework is 
inadequate for dealing with their human rights.
40
 The following section will examine the 
extent to which the theoretical duties owed to future generations can be also be 
operationalised as legal duties under international human rights law.  
 
4.  DUTIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
  
Human rights-based approaches offer potential as a means of improving the effectiveness of 
responses to climate change, while also addressing the problem of intergenerational injustice; 
yet, the ability of international human rights law to enforce the rights of future generations 
remains problematic.
41
 The phrase ‘human rights-based approach to climate change’ 
                                                 
39 Feinberg (n 33). 
40 Hiskes (n 24); Stephen Tully, ‘Like Oil and Water: A Sceptical Appraisal of Climate Change and Human 
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encompasses a diverse range of techniques for applying human rights principles and laws to 
the problem of climate change. At the most legalistic end of the spectrum, it envisages 
victims of climate change utilising international, regional or domestic human rights laws and 
institutions to bring claims against those responsible for global warming where it has led to 
alleged violations of their legally guaranteed human rights. A less formal approach involves 
an increased incorporation of human rights principles into climate negotiations and policy 
development and utilises existing human rights principles and frameworks as analytical tools 
for assessing the implications of climate change on individuals and communities. The success 
of more legal methods depends on being able to identify and enforce the duties which 
correspond to the rights in question. This section will consider the question of which duties 
are owed by States to future generations and how those duties might be used to address 
climate change.  
 Under international human rights law, the obligations of States can be understood to 
operate on three levels. The first level of obligation is the duty to respect human rights. This 
is a negative duty, which obliges States to refrain from acting in a manner which would 
negatively impact on human rights.
42
 The second level of obligation is the duty to protect 
human rights. This entails that States take steps to ensure that other parties do not interfere 
with human rights. Under this duty, States must supervise and regulate the activities of 
private entities and put in place appropriate safeguards to prevent human rights abuse.
43
 The 
third level of obligation is the duty to fulfil human rights. This duty requires the most of 
States as it imposes an obligation to take positive steps to ensure that all people are able to 
enjoy the rights to which they are entitled.
44
 The precise requirements for each level of 
obligation will depend on the specific right and the way it is defined in international law. 
Under international human rights law, States are traditionally considered to owe 
obligations to their citizens and to those under their jurisdiction.
45
 This has typically 
presented the question of whether the tripartite duties of States to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights are owed to persons outside of their territories. A similar question can be asked 
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about whether, and to what extent, the duties imposed by human rights law are owed to 
members of future generations.  
The notion that States owe duties to persons within their jurisdiction has been 
interpreted to include any person who is under the control of a State or affected by the 
operation of its laws.
46
 This could give an extraterritorial application to a State’s human 
rights duties, extending them to any person who is affected by the State’s action. In relation 
to environmental harm, Boyle has argued that, where it is possible for a State to take action 
which will mitigate or prevent the harm, ‘the argument that the State has no obligation to do 
so merely because the harm is extraterritorial is not a compelling one’.47  
A similar argument could be made with respect to future generations. A strict reading 
of international human rights law would suggest that States do not owe obligations to people 
who have not yet been born, as they would not fall within the class of citizens or persons 
under the jurisdiction of the State. However, where a State has the ability to affect the rights 
of a person (be they currently alive or not yet born) then it is argued that the State must 
exercise that power in a way which is consistent with human rights.  It makes no difference 
whether the consequences of a State’s exercise of power or control occur in the short or long-
term – the duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights are owed to members of both 
present and future generations where those persons can be considered either citizens of the 
State or under the jurisdiction or control of the State.  
In the context of climate change, what do the tripartite human rights obligations entail 
for States with respect to future generations? The duty to respect human rights seems the 
most obviously applicable, as it suggests that States should refrain from taking action now 
which is likely to negatively impact on the capacity of future generations to enjoy their rights.  
Given the serious consequences of climate change described above, the duty to respect 
human rights would appear to entail an obligation not to contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions. It would also mean that when a State does take action on climate change, it must 
ensure that such strategies will not interfere with the rights of future generations.
48
  The duty 
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to respect human rights therefore operates as a minimum standard to ensure that the actions 
of States do not cause further interference with human rights.
49
 
 The duty to protect the human rights of future generations would require that States 
take measures to protect against the harmful effects of climate change, including by taking 
adaptation measures and by putting in place appropriate regulations to control the emissions 
of private actors. The duty to fulfil human rights imposes an obligation on States to address 
the negative impacts of climate change.
50
 With respect to future generations, this level of 
obligation is the most difficult to apply, given the uncertainty surrounding precisely what the 
impacts will be and what the members of future generations will require. However, States 
should at least take steps to establish conditions which are most favourable to the fulfilment 
of human rights. Where climate change impacts are predicted with high levels of certainty, 
States should be taking measures to ensure that the impact on future generations is minimised 
wherever possible, including taking positive steps to improve infrastructure, systems and 
capacity. 
 
5. POTENTIAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL LEGAL ACTION BASED ON A 
VIOLATION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS’ RIGHTS 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that future generations are theoretically capable of 
possessing human rights, and that the obligations of States under human rights law should be 
considered to extend to future impacts. However, even if a duty can be established, this does 
not mean that States will be found to have violated that duty where future generations suffer 
adversely from climate change. There are a number of factors which affect whether a State 
could be found to have violated its obligations,
51
 and these ultimately influence the usefulness 
of rights-based approaches to climate change. As well as issues relating to whether a 
violation could be proved, there are also significant issues relating to how a State should 
balance potentially competing human rights obligations.  
One obvious issue with respect to claiming for violations of the rights of future 
generations is the question of who would have standing to bring a legal action on their behalf. 
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Human rights claims are usually brought in response to violations which have already 
occurred, rather than predicted future violations, and the human rights legal framework is not 
well equipped to facilitate claims for future harm.
52
 There are measures which could be 
employed to overcome the obstacle of standing. Non-government organizations could be 
recognised as having the right to represent potential injured parties, including unborn 
persons.
53
 The possibility of actions to protect the global commons could also be explored 
further, in a similar fashion to erga omnes actions currently available under international 
law.
54
 An ombudsman or guardian could be appointed and empowered to pursue breaches of 
human rights law on behalf of future generations, similar to the domestic models which will 
be considered in the following section.
55
 All of these measures would require a change to the 
current framework of international human rights law, however, and without such an 
adjustment, human rights claims appear to be restricted to cases of where harm involves 
injury to present generations or at least is considered to be imminent.
56
 
 
5.1 PROVING A VIOLATION 
 
Putting aside the challenge of establishing standing and assuming a claim can be commenced, 
claims for human rights breaches related to climate change will face the challenge of proving 
that a State has caused the alleged harm and that in doing so it has violated its legal duties. 
This is more difficult where the alleged harm is the result of climate change, as opposed to 
harm arising from a specific adaptation or mitigation activity (although proving a violation 
may not be a straightforward matter in these cases either). The task of proving a human rights 
violation related to climate change involves two steps. First, there is the challenge of 
attributing the particular harm to climate change. This entails showing that the environmental 
impact which interferes with human rights is a consequence of anthropogenic global 
warming. Second, there is the problem of tracing the causal connection between emitters and 
victims, a task which is arguably much harder.
57
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 The problem of proof can be attributed both to the complexity of the causal links 
involved and the long period of time between cause and effect.
58
 As Pedersen explains, ‘[A] 
significant and forensically problematic delay exists between the emission of gases and the 
manifestations of any actual harm’.59 This would be the case even where claimants are 
contemporaries and impacts are measurable, but it is even more problematic when the claim 
relates to anticipated harm which will affect future generations. Further, it is often impossible 
to attribute a particular event to global warming, given that it is frequently only one of a 
number of contributing factors.
60
 There are some examples where the connection between 
greenhouse gas emissions and negative human rights impacts is easier to establish. For 
instance, in the Maldives there is substantial scientific consensus that greenhouse gas 
emissions are causing sea level rises which will threaten the country.
61
 However, in many 
instances the impact on future generations is likely to be caused by a multitude of different, 
interrelated factors, of which greenhouse gas emissions are just one. 
The second challenge in proving a breach of human rights based on the impacts of 
climate change is attributing the harm to the actions or omissions of a particular State. The 
cumulative effect of greenhouse gas emissions makes it almost impossible to hold a particular 
State responsible for a given consequence.
62
 The Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights has reported on the relationship between climate change and human rights and 
concluded that it would be ‘virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal 
relationship linking historic greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a specific 
climate change-related effect’.63 These problems are aggravated when the harm concerned 
has not yet materialised but is predicted to affect future generations, and the challenge of 
proving causation and attributing harm becomes more difficult the further into the future one 
looks.  
 
5.2   BALANCING COMPETING RIGHTS 
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Complicating the matter further is the fact that States bear a range of responsibilities which 
commonly intersect and may, at times, be incompatible. As was noted above, the human 
rights impacts of climate change include not only the consequences of the resulting 
environmental changes, but also the effects (and side-effects) of the steps taken to mitigate or 
adapt to climate change. A balance must therefore be struck between the need to take action 
on climate change to prevent future human rights impacts and the need to ensure that such 
action does not violate other human rights in the shorter term.
64
  
At the same time, the advancement of human rights is linked to economic 
development, which requires access to reliable and affordable energy sources. For many 
States, the burning of fossil fuels presents the fastest and cheapest way of providing this 
energy.
65
 States which are called upon to reduce greenhouse gas emissions might argue that 
some level of emissions is necessary in order to fulfil the current needs of their citizens. 
Given that those emissions will cause negative impacts on the ability of future generations to 
enjoy their rights, States are presented with the challenge of how to balance current needs 
against future rights.  
From a theoretical standpoint, this raises a question of the relative weight to be given 
to the rights of contemporary and future generations. If one accepts the theoretical 
proposition outlined above in section 3 that members of future generations possess the same 
interests in health, subsistence and a decent standard of living as current generations, then 
there is no morally significant reason to discount the interests of future generations.
66
  
In practical terms, however, the question of how States should balance competing 
rights is problematic, given that States possess limited resources and choices will inevitably 
need to be made. Scholars such as Lawrence have suggested strategies for addressing this 
challenge. He has proposed a ‘structural reform principle’, which puts the onus on 
policymakers not to delay structural reforms necessary to ensure the protection of the long-
term interests of future generations, while avoiding harm to the core rights of current 
generations.
67
  
Human rights law provides some guidance for balancing competing rights through its 
tripartite framework of obligations (outlined above) and its recognition that some rights, 
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particularly economic, social and cultural rights, must be realised progressively. This seems 
to support a pragmatic approach where the most pressing needs are given priority, with States 
working to fulfil the fundamental needs of current generations, while ensuring that the rights 
of future generations are respected.   
The question of how to balance competing human rights is a complex one, and is 
further complicated when the rights of future generations are included in the mix, given the 
difficulty of predicting and measuring the extent of potential future impacts. Further work is 
therefore required to develop useful strategies for achieving an appropriate balance, but this 
discussion demonstrates the difficulties of using existing international human rights law to 
establish a violation of the rights of future generations where the harm flows from actions 
which may be justified as fulfilling other human rights.  
 
6.   DOMESTIC MODELS FOR PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF FUTURE 
GENERATIONS  
 
As shown, there are clear difficulties inherent in proving that a State has violated its 
obligations under international human rights law with respect to the impact of climate change 
on future generations. A number of alternative approaches could be pursued however which 
advance the interests of future generations but which do not focus on establishing that a 
breach of human rights law has occurred. A number of countries have already implemented 
measures for giving consideration to the interests of future generations in legislative and 
policy-making processes. This section will outline some examples of the most common 
models and comment on their potential effectiveness in terms of addressing the 
intergenerational injustice which flows from climate change.  
A number of countries have established independent agencies or officers to 
investigate and advise government regarding matters which may affect future generations.  
The powers of such bodies vary considerably, with some being limited to an advisory role 
and others being empowered to investigate complaints from members of the public and 
recommend changes to legislation. Most also have a role in promoting public awareness and 
education about the impact of policies on future generations. Often the roles are linked 
specifically to the environment and sustainable development, although some have a broader 
mandate to address future impacts in a variety of areas.  
In Hungary, the Deputy-Commissioner for Future Generations (also known as the 
Ombudsman for Future Generations and established under the Commissioner for 
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Fundamental Rights) has a range of powers designed to uphold the rights of future 
generations as recognised in the Hungarian constitution. The Fundamental Law of Hungary 
states that ‘Natural resources […] shall comprise the nation’s common heritage that should be 
protected and preserved for future generations’.68    
The functions of the Ombudsman are to monitor compliance with the Fundamental 
Law and to draw attention to issues which may be a problem in this respect.
69
 Where it is 
believed that an act is likely to infringe the rights of future generations, the Ombudsman has 
the power to request that the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights refer the matter to the 
Constitutional Court.
70
 The Ombudsman may also propose the adoption or amendment of any 
law in the interests of future generations.
71
 Members of the public are able to turn to the 
Ombudsman when a public official or agency acts against the rights of future generations and 
the Ombudsman can participate in a relevant inquiry conducted by the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights.
72
 However, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is not able to 
investigate the actions of Parliament, the President, the State Audit Office, the Constitutional 
Court or other courts or prosecutors.
73
 
As an alternative to appointing an individual to advocate on behalf of future 
generations, a number of States have introduced committees or panels of experts to ensure 
that the interests of future generations are taken into account in legislative and policy-making 
processes. Canada has established an independent commission of experts within the office of 
the Auditor General known as the Commission on Environment and Sustainable 
Development (CESD).
74
 The CESD has regard to the interests of future generations 
specifically within the context of environmental protection and sustainable development, and 
monitors the utilisation of public resources and environmental decision-making.
75
 It provides 
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Parliament with advice and supervises government departments in meeting their sustainable 
development targets.
76
  
New Zealand's Parliamentary Commission for the Environment is a body appointed 
by Parliament and headed by the Commissioner for the Environment, who is appointed for a 
term of five years. The Commission is given broad powers to investigate and report, 
including the power to audit the various government bodies which have responsibility for the 
use of natural resources.
77
 It also provides information to Parliament on matters relating to 
environmental protection and sustainable development.
78
 The Commissioner is empowered to 
receive complaints from the public relating to the environment and to conduct inquiries, 
including the power to compel witnesses and take testimony under oath. Despite these broad 
powers, the Commissioner is not able to reverse or override any act of Parliament.
79
 A 
number of other countries have created similar bodies which oversee the implementation of 
policies on sustainable development and provide advice to government. These include 
Wales,
80
 Malta,
81
 and Belgium.
82
  
In a number of other countries, committees have been established within Parliament 
to scrutinise proposed legislation and assess its potential to impact on the interests of future 
generations. Created in 2001, the Israeli Commission for Future Generations possessed 
authority to intervene in the passage of legislation and to insist that parliament address any 
significant impacts on future generations before proceeding with the passage of new law.
83
 
The Commission reviewed future impacts in a range of areas, including the environment and 
natural resources, economic development, science and technology, education, health, and 
quality of life. Ultimately, however, it was felt that such power resulted in too great an 
interference with Parliament’s authority and the Commission was disbanded in 2006.84  
In Finland, the Committee for the Future is a parliamentary committee which has been 
created to assess the future outlook for Finland and advise on the impact of legislation and 
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policies in a wide range of areas.
85
 The Committee consists of 10 per cent of the Finnish 
Parliament and reports on issues relating to science, technology, environment, development, 
climate change, energy or any other matter which may be relevant to Finland’s future.86  
Sweden has also created a dedicated Commission on the Future of Sweden which is given the 
task of identifying critical challenges likely to face the nation in the period of 2020-2050, 
particularly on issues relating to demography, equality and democracy, sustainable growth 
and social values.
87
 
Germany’s Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development is intended 
to oversee parliamentary activity on sustainable development and integrate environmental 
considerations into other policy-making. While its recommendations are not binding, the 
Council has proved influential in helping to shape legislation which promotes long-term 
responsibility and respect for the interests of future generations.
88
 Other countries which have 
adopted the parliamentary commission model include Brazil and Chile.
89
 
As can be seen, most of these bodies have authority to advocate on behalf of the 
interests of future generations in the specific context of environmental protection and 
sustainable development. This ought to allow scope for climate change impacts to be 
considered, although it is acknowledged that climate change is not specifically listed in all 
mandates. While such bodies are a useful mechanism for ensuring that the interests of future 
generations are taken into account, most are limited to an advisory role with no power to 
compel action or overrule legislation, and their success will ultimately rely on the extent to 
which their views are respected and adopted by lawmakers.
90
  
Yet this advisory role is significant, as it encompasses a thorough consideration of 
how policy or legislation will impact on future generations. Further, the advice which is 
subsequently provided to lawmakers can unequivocally advocate for the interests of future 
generations. Without such advocacy the interests of future generations are easily discounted 
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or put aside in favour of more urgent or obvious demands, and the balance between 
competing demands is less likely to be struck fairly and on the basis of good information.   
In the context of climate change, there is much that could be added to policy-making 
and legislative processes through the implementation of such measures. The influence of 
domestic models, particularly Hungary’s Ombudsman for Future Generations, inspired a call 
at the Rio +20 conference in 2012 for the creation of a similar position at the international 
level,
91
 and the United Nations has begun exploring the possibilities for initiatives in this 
area.
92
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
As the discussion above has illustrated, climate change threatens the human rights of future 
generations in various ways, and these impacts should be viewed as a form of 
intergenerational injustice. However, while human rights theory can conceive of future 
generations possessing rights, it is problematic to uphold and enforce these rights under 
current human rights law. Aside from the issue of standing, there are significant barriers to 
proving a violation of human rights law based on the future effects of climate change. This is 
particularly difficult given the various potentially competing human rights obligations with 
which States must comply.   
The problem of balancing the rights of contemporary and future generations is a 
significant one. The interests of future generations will not be fully realised while poverty 
and disadvantage continue to affect contemporary generations and, in many situations, the 
rights of present generations will take priority in circumstances where resources are limited. 
This need to attend to immediate, fundamental needs before addressing the rights of future 
generations inevitably limits the effectiveness of human rights law in correcting the 
intergenerational injustice which climate change represents. 
The challenge is to balance these competing demands in a way which is both 
equitable and effective. Achieving the right balance may be assisted through the work of 
dedicated bodies and offices which advocate for the interests of future generations to ensure 
that their rights are taken into account when decisions are made which are likely to affect 
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them.  An international agency dedicated to the interests of future generations, similar to 
those which currently exist within domestic legal systems, could contribute significantly in 
this respect by giving a voice to future generations in circumstances when they might 
otherwise be overlooked or overwhelmed by more present, more pressing needs.  
The extent to which such an agency could utilise human rights law is an issue which 
requires further exploration, given the limitations of human rights law outlined above.  
Among the issues to be considered is whether the agency could pursue the rights of future 
generations as enforceable claims against identified duty-bearers. Nonetheless, an 
understanding that future generations are capable of possessing human rights is an important 
first step to devising meaningful strategies to protecting those rights and alleviating the 
intergenerational injustice visited upon them by climate change.  
 
